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Abstract
The nonstandard approach to program semantics has successfully
resolved the completeness problem of Floyd-Hoare logic. The known
versions of nonstandard semantics, the Hungary semantics and ax-
iomatic semantics, are so general that they are absent either from
mathematical elegance or from practical usefulness. The aim of this
paper is to exhibit a not only mathematically elegant but also prac-
tically useful nonstandard semantics. A basic property of computable
functions in the standard model N of Peano arithmetic PA is Σ1-
definability. However, the functions induced by the standard inter-
pretation of while-programs S in nonstandard models M of PA are
not always arithmetical. The problem consists in that the standard
termination of S in M uses the finiteness in N , which is not the finite-
ness in M . To this end, we shall give a new interpretation of S in M
such that the termination of S uses M -finiteness, and the functions
produced by S in all models of PA have the uniform Σ1-definability.
Then we define, based on the new semantics of while-programs, a new
semantics of Hoare logic in nonstandard models of PA, and show that
the standard axiom system of Hoare logic is sound and complete w.r.t.
the new semantics. It will be established, in PA, that the Hungary
semantics and axiomatic semantics coincide with the new semantics
of while-programs. Moreover, various comparisons with the previous
results, usefulness of the nonstandard semantics, and remarks on the
completeness issues are presented.
Keywords: Hoare logic, Peano arithmetic, nonstandard models, non-
standard semantics, logical completeness
1 Introduction
Hoare logic is an axiomatic system of proving programs correct [1, 2, 3],
which has had a significant impact upon the methods of both designing and
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verifying programs [4, 5, 6]. Hoare logic for the set WP of while-programs
with the first-order logical language L and the first-order specification T ⊂ L
is denoted by HL(T ). Of special interest is the completeness of Hoare logic
over nonstandard models.
The approach of using nonstandard models [7] in investigating Floyd-
Hoare logic was started in [8, 9, 10], and pursued, refined by many authors
since then, e.g., Csirmaz [11], Andreka et.al [12], Hortala´-Gonza´lez et.al
[13], and Pasztor [14]. (For an extensive literature, see e.g. the references
in [15].) It’s noteworthy that the Hungary semantics in [10] is defined over
a particular class of infinite sequences of vectors of numbers that should
satisfy the induction axioms for all formulas, and Floyd logic is logically
complete w.r.t. this semantics. In addition, according to the Floyd-Hoare
principle [2, 3], which states that the semantics of a programming language
can be formally specified by the axioms and inference rules for proving the
correctness of programs written in this language, an axiomatic semantics of
while-programs has been suggested by Bergstra and Tucker [16] for which
Hoare logic is logically complete. Observe that the Hungary semantics and
axiomatic semantics are so general that they are absent either from mathe-
matical elegance or from practical usefulness. It would be interesting, from
a new perspective, to exhibit a not only mathematically elegant but also
practically useful nonstandard semantics. In what follows, unless otherwise
stated, let L be the logical language of Peano arithmetic PA, and let N be
the standard model of PA.
The definability theorem [17, Chapter 16] says that a function in N
is computable (or equivalently N -computable [18]) iff it is Σ1-definable in
N (i.e., the graph relation of this function is Σ1), which means that a com-
putable function should be “simple”. The proof of this theorem only consid-
ers a finite computation in N , which can be encoded as a natural number in a
uniform way. In nonstandard models M of PA [19], a while-program S pro-
duces a (pseudo-M -computable) function ~y = fMS (~x). Intuitively we hope
that fMS is simple in M , that is, Σ1-definable in M . However, it is hopeless,
because for the while-program S ::= y := 0;while y < x do y := y+1 od, fMS
is not Σ1-definable, since the domain of f
M
S is N
M , the standard part of M ,
which is not arithmetical by Robinson’s overspill lemma [17, Lemma 25.8].
The problem consists in the interpretation of while-programs in M , where
the termination uses the finiteness in N (i.e. the usual finiteness), which
is not the finiteness in M . We shall introduce the concept of M -finiteness
for the finiteness in M and show that every M -finite sequence of vectors
of numbers of M can be coded uniformly as a number of M . Then a new
interpretation of while-programs S in all models M of PA such that the ter-
mination of S uses M -finiteness will be given (the new input-output relation
of S in M is denoted by AMS in order to distinguish from the standard one
RMS ). It will be shown that A
M
S produces a simple function ~y = g
M
S (~x) in M .
On the other hand, there exists a Σ1-formula αS(~x, ~y) ∈ L, dependent on
2
S but independent of any model of PA, that defines an (abstract) function
~y = gS(~x) in PA, i.e., PA ` ∀~x, ~y, ~z(αS(~x, ~y)∧ αS(~x, ~z/~y)→ ~y = ~z). (Actu-
ally the formula αS(~x, ~y) can be chosen as one defining the N -computable
function fNS produced by S in N .) It will be found that the interpretation
of gS in M coincides with g
M
S , for every M |= PA. To illustrates this, the
following commutative diagram is shown. Thus, the new interpretation of
S αS
AMS g
M
S
Figure 1: The commutative diagram for while-programs
while-programs extend N -computability from N to nonstandard models of
PA with the uniform Σ1-definability. We can now define M -computability
to be the computability induced by the new semantics of while-programs
in M . In Subsection 4.2, the new semantics of while-programs is com-
pared with the standard semantics; and Example 4.2.1 shows that (x, 0),
(x, 1), . . . , (x, x) is the unique sequence of vectors of M computable by
S ::= y := 0;while y < x do y := y + 1 od with the input (x, 0) for the new
semantics (i.e., gMS (x, y) = (x, x)).
We shall define, based on the new semantics of while-programs, a new
semantics of Hoare logic in nonstandard models of PA. It will be proved
that for any PA ⊆ T ⊆ Th(N), the standard axiom system of HL(T ) is
sound and complete w.r.t. the new semantics. It will be established, in
PA, that the Hungary semantics and axiomatic semantics coincide with
the new semantics of while-programs, and that the axiom system of Floyd
logic is essentially the same as that of Hoare logic. Moreover, the reduction
from HL(T ) to T with PA ⊆ T ⊆ Th(N) follows from the new complete-
ness theorem of HL(T ), and the usefulness of the nonstandard semantics in
Hoare logic is discussed. Finally, a detailed and thorough discussion of the
completeness issues on Hoare logic is given.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: some preliminary re-
sults are presented in Section 2; the concept of M -finiteness is introduced in
Section 3; the definition of the new semantics of while-programs, and com-
parison with the standard and Hungary semantics are given in Section 4; the
soundness and completeness of HL(T ) w.r.t. the new semantics, reduction
from HL(T ) to T , and comparison with Floyd logic are shown in Section 5;
the comparison with axiomatic semantics, and usefulness of nonstandard se-
mantics in Hoare logic are shown in Section 6; remarks on the completeness
issues of Hoare logic are given in Section 7; Section 8 concludes the paper.
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2 Preliminaries
First some notations are introduced: in syntax, we write ¬,∧,∨,→,↔, ∀, ∃
to denote the negation, conjunction, disjunction, conditional, biconditional
connectives and the universal, existential quantifiers; in semantics, we write
∼,&, |,⇒,⇔,A,E to denote the corresponding connectives and quantifiers.
2.1 Peano arithmetic
Let L be the logical language of PA with the signature Σ = {+, ·, <, 0, 1}.
For simplicity, the sum of 1 with itself n times is abbreviated as n. We
use n to denote both a closed term and a natural number, and use M to
denote both a model and its domain, which will be clear from the context.
The formula ϕ(t/x) stands for the result of simultaneously substituting t for
free occurrences of x in ϕ; and ϕ(t/x) will be denoted ϕ(t) if the default
variable x is obvious. The denotation of a term t at an assignment v (for
all the first order variables) over a model M of L, denoted tM,v, receives the
standard meaning. The satisfaction of a formula ϕ ∈ L at an assignment v
over a model M of L, denoted M, v |= ϕ, is defined as usual; the satisfaction
of ϕ in M , denoted M |= ϕ, is defined such that for any assignment v
over M , M,v |= ϕ; the satisfaction of a theory T ⊂ L in M , denoted
M |= T , is defined such that for any ϕ ∈ T , M |= ϕ; the satisfaction
of ϕ in a theory T ⊂ L, denoted T |= ϕ, is defined such that for any
M |= T , M |= ϕ. And the derivation of a formula ϕ ∈ L from a theory
T ⊂ L, denoted T ` ϕ, is defined as usual. The set of all theorems of
T ⊂ L, denoted Thm(T ), is defined to be Thm(T ) ::= {ϕ ∈ L : T `
ϕ}. From Peano’s axioms, one can deduce the induction axiom scheme
ϕ(0, ~y) ∧ ∀x(ϕ(x, ~y) → ϕ(x + 1, ~y)) → ∀x ϕ(x, ~y), the bounded induction
scheme ϕ(0, ~y) ∧ ∀x < z(ϕ(x, ~y) → ϕ(x + 1, ~y)) → ∀x ≤ z ϕ(x, ~y) and the
least-number principle ∃x ϕ(x, ~y) → ∃z(ϕ(z, ~y) ∧ ∀u < z ¬ϕ(u, ~y)), where
ϕ(x, ~y) ∈ L.
Go¨del’s completeness theorem implies that for any T ⊂ L, T ` ϕ iff
T |= ϕ. The proof of this theorem shows that for any T ⊂ L and any
ϕ ∈ L, if T 0 ϕ then there is a countable model M of L such that M |= T
and M 2 ϕ. This means that T |= ϕ is equivalent to saying that for any
countable M |= T , M |= ϕ (the implication from left to right is trivial;
for the opposite direction, assume that T 2 ϕ, by Go¨del’s completeness
theorem T 0 ϕ, then there exists a countable M |= T such that M 2 ϕ, a
contradiction), so in this paper only the countable models will be considered.
Let K be the set consisting of all natural numbers together with all pairs
(q, a) where q is a rational number and a an integer. Let <K be the order
on K in which the natural numbers come first, in their usual order, and the
pairs afterward, ordered as follows: (q, a) <K (r, b) iff q < r in the usual
order on rational numbers, or q = r and a < b in the usual order on integers.
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Lemma 2.1.1 (Cf. [17, p304]). The order relation on any countable non-
standard model of PA is isomorphic to the ordering <K of K.
By a ∆0-formula (or alternatively rudimentary formula) of L we mean a
formula built up from atomic formulas using only negation, conjunction, dis-
junction, and bounded quantifications ∀x < t and ∃x < t, where t is a term
of L (possibly involving free variables). (Conditionals and biconditionals are
allowed, too, since these officially are just abbreviations for certain construc-
tions involving negation, conjunction, and disjunction. So are the bounded
quantifiers ∀x ≤ t and ∃x ≤ t, since these are equivalent to ∀x < t+ 1 and
∃x < t + 1.) By a Σ1-formula (or alternatively ∃-rudimentary formula) we
mean a formula of form ∃x F where F is a ∆0-formula. It holds, in PA, that
every generalized Σ1-formula, obtainable from ∆0-formulas by conjunction,
disjunction, bounded quantifications, and unbounded existential quantifica-
tion, is logically equivalent to a Σ1-formula. (The equivalence in N is shown
in [17, Proposition 16.10], and similarly for nonstandard models.)
2.2 Coding functions
Definition 2.2.1. The following definitions (cf. [19, p54], [20, p42]) are
thought of as taking place in PA.
(a)
⌊
x
y
⌋
(the integer part of x divided by y) is the two-place function
⌊x
y
⌋
=

the unique z s.t.
z · y ≤ x < (z + 1) · y, if y 6= 0;
0, if y = 0.
(b)
(
x
y
)
(the remainder on dividing x by y) is given by
(x
y
)
=

the unique z s.t.
∃w ≤ x(y · w + z = x ∧ z < y), if y 6= 0;
x, otherwise.
(c) x− y is defined by
x− y =
{
the unique z s.t. x = y + z, if y ≤ x;
0, otherwise.
(d)
√
x = the unique y s.t. y · y ≤ x < (y + 1) · (y + 1).
The pairing function and unpairing functions in [20, p45] build a one-to-
one correspondence between the set of ordered pairs of natural numbers and
the set of natural numbers, and similarly for nonstandard models of PA.
We formulate this by the following.
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Definition 2.2.2. Let T1(z) ::=
⌊√
8·z+1+1
2
⌋
− 1 and let T2(z) ::= 2 · z −
T1(z) · T1(z). We define 〈x, y〉, L(z) and R(z) by
〈x, y〉 =
⌊(x+ y + 1) · (x+ y)
2
⌋
+ y,
L(z) =
⌊T2(z)− T1(z)
2
⌋
,
R(z) = T1(z)− L(z).
Lemma 2.2.3. PA proves that
(a) 〈L(z), R(z)〉 = z;
(b) L(〈x, y〉) = x;
(c) R(〈x, y〉) = y.
Notice that 〈x, y〉 is called extended pairing function and L(z), R(z)
extended unpairing functions, each of which extends the classical counter-
part from N to nonstandard models of PA. For notational convenience,
(L(z), R(z)) is denoted by z. The extended pairing and unpairing functions
can be generalized to n-tuples (for each n ∈ N) by setting 〈x1, x2, . . . , xn〉 =
〈x1, 〈x2, . . . , xn〉〉 and 〈x1, x2, . . . , xn〉 = (x1, 〈x2, . . . , xn〉).
Definition 2.2.4. Define (x)i to be
(x)i =
( L(x)
R(x) · (i+ 1) + 1
)
.
Such a function (x)i is usually called Go¨del’s β-function, but in the
present context we obviously prefer the more suggestive term extended β-
function. It’s easy to check, using Definition 2.2.4, that for every M |= PA
and every w ∈ M , there exists i ∈ M such that M |= ∀j > i((w)j = (w)i).
By the Chinese Remainder Theorem, (x)i can be used to code every finite
sequence of natural numbers by choosing a suitable (but not unique) value
for x: for every finite sequence a0, a1, . . . , an of natural numbers, there exists
a natural number w such that N |= (w)i = ai for all i ≤ n [20, Theorem
2.4]. The following lemma formalizes this inside PA.
Lemma 2.2.5 (Cf. [19, p63]). PA proves that
(a) ∀x,∃y (y)0 = x;
(b) ∀x, y, z, ∃w((∀i < z (w)i = (y)i) ∧ (w)z = x).
By Lemma 2.2.5, using mathematical induction, it follows that
Lemma 2.2.6 (Go¨del’s Lemma, cf. [19, Lemma 5.9]). Let M |= PA, and
let n ∈ N with x0, x1, . . ., xn−1 ∈ M . Then there exists w ∈ M such that
M |= (w)i = xi for all i < n.
Note that these extended coding functions are all definable in PA by
∆0-formulas of L.
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2.3 Hoare logic
Based on the first-order logical language L, together with the program con-
structs (:=, ;, if , then, else, fi, while, do, od), a while-program S is defined
by S ::= x := E | S1;S2 | if B then S1 else S2 fi | while B do S0 od,
where an expression E is defined by E ::= 0 | 1 | x | E1 + E2 | E1 · E2, and
a boolean expression B is defined by B ::= E1 < E2 | ¬B1 | B1 → B2. The
set of all such while-programs is denoted WP . Without further declaration,
for a while-program S ∈ WP , the vector (x1, x2, . . . , xn) of all n program
variables x1, x2, . . . , xn occurring in S will be denoted by ~x; the vector
(a1, a2, . . . , an) of n numbers a1, a2, . . . , an ∈ M will be denoted by ~a; the
connectives will be assumed to distribute over the components of the vectors
(for instance, ~a ∈M means a1, a2, . . . , an ∈M , ~x = ~y means
∧n
i=1 xi = yi,
and ϕ(~t/~x) means ϕ(t1/x1, t2/x2, . . . , tn/xn)). For an assignment v over a
model M of L, let v(~x) be the vector of elements of M assigned to ~x at v,
and let v(~y/~x) be an assignment as v except that v(~y/~x)(~x) = ~y. For every
S ∈ WP and every model M of L, the standard input-output relation RMS
of S in M is a binary relation on the set of assignments over M inductively
defined as follows:
• (v, v′) ∈ RMx:=E ⇔ v′ = v(EM,v/x);
• (v, v′) ∈ RMS1;S2 ⇔ (v, v′) ∈ RMS1 ◦ RMS2 , where (z, z′) ∈ R1 ◦ R2 ⇔
Ez′′((z, z′′) ∈ R1 & (z′′, z′) ∈ R2);
• (v, v′) ∈ RMif B then S1 else S2 fi ⇔ M,v |= B & (v, v′) ∈ RMS1 | M,v 6|=
B & (v, v′) ∈ RMS2 ;
• (v, v′) ∈ RMwhile B do S0 od ⇔ Ei ∈ N , E ~x0, . . . , ~xi ∈ M (v(~x) = ~x0
& Aj < i(M,v( ~xj/~x) |= B & (v( ~xj/~x), v( ~xj+1/~x)) ∈ RMS0) & v′ =
v(~xi/~x) & M,v
′ 6|= B).
Given S ∈ WP and a model M of L, RMS produces a vectorial function
~y = fMS (~x) such that for any ~a,
~b ∈ M , fMS (~a) = ~b ⇔ Ev, v′(v(~x) =
~a & v′(~x) = ~b & (v, v′) ∈ RMS ). Given a model M of L and an asserted
program {p}S{q}, {p}S{q} is satisfied at M w.r.t. the standard semantics,
denoted M |=S {p}S{q}, iff for any assignment v over M , M,v |= p ⇒
Av′
(
(v, v′) ∈ RMS ⇒ M, v′ |= q
)
. Given a theory T ⊂ L and an asserted
program {p}S{q}, {p}S{q} is satisfied at T w.r.t. the standard semantics,
denoted by HL(T ) |=S {p}S{q}, iff for any M |= T , M |=S {p}S{q}.
Hoare logic HL(T ) for the set WP of while-programs with the first-order
logical language L and the first-order specification T ⊂ L has the standard
axioms and inference rules [1, Section 2]: let p, q, p1, q1, r ∈ L, and let S, S0,
S1, S2 ∈WP .
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(1) Assignment Axiom Scheme: for E an expression of L and x a variable
of L, the asserted program
{p(E/x)}x := E{p}
is an axiom.
(2) Composition Rule:
{p}S1{r}, {r}S2{q}
{p}S1;S2{q}
(3) Conditional Rule:
{p ∧B}S1{q}, {p ∧ ¬B}S2{q}
{p}if B then S1 else S2 fi{q}
(4) Iteration Rule:
{r ∧B}S0{r}
{r}while B do S0 od{r ∧ ¬B}
(5) Consequence Rule:
p→ p1, {p1}S{q1}, q1 → q
{p}S{q}
And, in connection with (5),
(6) Specification Axiom: each theorem of T is an axiom.
We writeHL(T ) ` {p}S{q} to denote that the asserted program {p}S{q}
is provable from HL(T ). By the logical completeness of HL(T ) w.r.t.
the standard semantics is meant that for any asserted program {p}S{q},
HL(T ) ` {p}S{q} iff HL(T ) |=S {p}S{q}.
3 The concept of M-finiteness
To begin with, the notion of pseudo-M -finiteness is introduced.
Definition 3.1. Let M |= PA. A sequence of numbers of M is pseudo-M -
finite if it is indexed by an initial segment of M . That is, every sequence of
numbers a0, a1, . . . , ai ∈M with i ∈M is pseudo-M -finite.
The sequences as defined above behave like finite sequences as far as the
underlying model is concerned, but they may be infinite sequences when
viewed from the outside world: let i ∈ M |= PA be nonstandard; the
pseudo-M -finite sequence of numbers 0, 1, . . ., i is infinite. In particular,
every pseudo-N -finite (or equivalently finite) sequence of natural numbers
can be coded as a natural number by extended β-function. However, this
property doesn’t hold for nonstandard models.
8
Proposition 3.2. Every countable nonstandard model M of PA has a
pseudo-M -finite sequence of numbers that can’t be coded as a number by
extended β-function.
Proof. Let i ∈M be nonstandard. We consider the set A = { < a0, a1, . . .,
ai > : for each j ≤ i, aj = 0 or 1 } of pseudo-M -finite sequences of numbers
of M . It’s obvious that A is uncountable. However, M has only a countable
number of elements used as codes. This means that one of elements of A
can’t be coded as a number of M by extended β-function.
Definition 3.3. Let M |= PA. A pseudo-M -finite sequence ~a0, ~a1, . . .,
~ai of vectors of numbers of M is M -finite if there exist ψ(~x, y, ~z) ∈ L (the
arguments ~x, y could be dummy) and ~a ∈M such that for all j smaller than
or equal to i there is a unique ~z ∈ M satisfying M |= ψ(~a, j, ~z), and this ~z
happens to be ~aj , in symbols M |= ∀j ≤ i(∃!~z ψ(~a, j, ~z) ∧ ψ(~a, j, ~aj)).
For the sequence ~x0, ~x1, . . ., ~xn ∈ M |= PA with n ∈ N , by Lemmas
2.2.3 and 2.2.6, there exist ψ(x, y, ~z) ::= (x)y = ~z and x ∈ M such that
M |= ∀j ≤ n(∃!~z ψ(x, j, ~z) ∧ ψ(x, j, ~xj)). For the sequence 0, 1, . . ., i with
i ∈M |= PA being nonstandard, there exist ψ(x, y, z) ::= z = y and x ∈M
such that M |= ∀j ≤ i(∃!z ψ(x, j, z) ∧ ψ(x, j, j)). Observe from the above
that the concept of finiteness is equal to that of N -finiteness (in symbols,
finiteness = N -finiteness) and, for any nonstandard M |= PA, the concept
of finiteness is strictly less than that of M -finiteness (in symbols, finiteness
< M -finiteness).
The following theorem shows that for any M |= PA, every M -finite
sequence of vectors of numbers of M can be coded as a number of M by
extended coding functions.
Theorem 3.4. Let ψ(~x, y, ~z) ∈ L and M |= PA. Then we have
M |= ∀~x, y(∀i ≤ y,∃!~z ψ(~x, i, ~z)
→ ∃w,∀i ≤ y,∀~z(ψ(~x, i, ~z)→ (w)i = ~z)).
Proof. Fix ~x ∈M . It suffices to prove that M |= ∀y(∀i ≤ y,∃!~z ψ(~x, i, ~z)→
∃w,∀i ≤ y,∀~z(ψ(~x, i, ~z) → (w)i = ~z)) by induction on y in the formula
∀i ≤ y,∃!~z ψ(~x, i, ~z)→ ∃w,∀i ≤ y,∀~z(ψ(~x, i, ~z)→ (w)i = ~z).
Suppose that M |= ∀i ≤ 0,∃!~z ψ(~x, i, ~z) for y = 0. Then there exists
a unique ~z ∈ M such that M |= ψ(~x, 0, ~z). Using Lemmas 2.2.3 and 2.2.5,
there is w ∈ M such that M |= (w)0 = ~z. It follows that M |= ∃w,∀i ≤
0,∀~z(ψ(~x, i, ~z)→ (w)i = ~z). Thus we have
M |= ∀i ≤ 0, ∃!~z ψ(~x, i, ~z)
→ ∃w,∀i ≤ 0, ∀~z(ψ(~x, i, ~z)→ (w)i = ~z).
As the induction hypothesis, suppose
M |= ∀i ≤ y,∃!~z ψ(~x, i, ~z)
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→ ∃w,∀i ≤ y,∀~z(ψ(~x, i, ~z)→ (w)i = ~z)
for any y ∈M . Then we consider the case for y+1. Assume that M |= ∀i ≤
y+1, ∃!~z ψ(~x, i, ~z). That is, there exists a unique sequence ~z0, . . . , ~zy, ~zy+1 ∈
M such that M |= ∀i ≤ y + 1 ψ(~x, i, ~zi). By the induction hypothesis there
exists w ∈ M such that M |= ∀i ≤ y,∀~z(ψ(~x, i, ~z) → (w)i = ~z). That is,
M |= ∀i ≤ y (w)i = ~zi. Using Lemmas 2.2.3 and 2.2.5, there exists w′ ∈ M
such that M |= ∀i < y+ 1 (w′)i = (w)i ∧ (w′)y+1 = ~zy+1 and hence we have
M |= ∃w,∀i ≤ y + 1,∀~z(ψ(~x, i, ~z)→ (w)i = ~z), so it follows that
M |= ∀i ≤ y + 1,∃!~z ψ(~x, i, ~z)
→ ∃w,∀i ≤ y + 1,∀~z(ψ(~x, i, ~z)→ (w)i = ~z).
It’s noteworthy, in Definition 3.3, that the uniqueness condition ∃!~z in
the assertion M |= ∀j ≤ i(∃!~z ψ(~a, j, ~z)∧ψ(~a, j, ~aj)) is extremely important:
let ψ(~x, y, z) ::= (z = 0) ∨ (z = 1); each element < a0, a1, . . . , ai > of A,
as defined in the proof of Proposition 3.2, satisfies the property M |= ∀j ≤
i ψ(~a, j, aj) for arbitrary ~a ∈M ; yet there exists such an element that can’t
be coded as a number of M .
Defining ψ(x, y, ~z) by ψ(x, y, ~z) ::= (x)y = ~z, it’s easy to see that every
pseudo-M -finite sequence of vectors of numbers of M coded as a number
of M by extended coding functions is M -finite. Hence the concept of M -
finiteness captures precisely what can be coded in M by extended coding
functions; so it could be taken as an ideal extension to the usual concept of
finiteness. We can say, in the sense of the above, that Theorem 3.4 extends
Go¨del’s Lemma (cf. Lemma 2.2.6) into a general setting.
4 The X-semantics of while-programs
4.1 The definition of the X-semantics
Definition 4.1.1 (The X-semantics of while-programs). Let M |= PA, and
S ∈ WP with program variables ~x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn). The new input-
output relation AMS for S on the set of assignments over M , and the formula
αS(~x, ~y) ∈ L for S, where ~y = (y1, y2, . . . , yn) is disjoint from ~x, are defined
inductively in (a) and (b) as follows:
Assignment: S ≡ xi := E.
(a) (v, v′) ∈ AMS ⇔ v′ = v(EM,v/xi).
(b) αS(~x, ~y) ::= yi = E(~x) ∧
∧j 6=i
1≤j≤n yj = xj .
Composition: S ≡ S1;S2.
(a) (v, v′) ∈ AMS ⇔ (v, v′) ∈ AMS1 ◦AMS2 .
(b) αS(~x, ~y) ::= ∃~z(αS1(~x, ~z/~y) ∧ αS2(~z/~x, ~y)).
Conditional: S ≡ if B then S1 else S2 fi.
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(a) (v, v′) ∈ AMS ⇔M,v |= B & (v, v′) ∈ AMS1 |M,v 6|= B & (v, v′) ∈ AMS2 .
(b) αS(~x, ~y) ::= (B(~x) ∧ αS1(~x, ~y)) ∨ (¬B(~x) ∧ αS2(~x, ~y)).
Iteration: S ≡ while B do S0 od.
We define the formula ϕS0(~x, y, ~z) ∈ L by
ϕS0(~x, y, ~z) ::= ∃w((w)0 = ~x ∧ ∀j < y αS0((w)j , (w)j+1) ∧ (w)y = ~z).
(a) (v, v′) ∈ AMS ⇔ E i, ~x0, ~x1, . . . , ~xi ∈M [ M |= ∀j ≤ i ϕS0(v(~x), j, ~xj)
& v(~x) = ~x0 & A j < i ( M, v( ~xj/~x) |= B & (v( ~xj/~x), v( ~xj+1/~x)) ∈ AMS0 )
& v′(~x) = ~xi & M, v′ 6|= B ].
(b) We first let
CS(i, w, ~x, ~y) ::= ~x = (w)0 ∧ ∀j < i(B((w)j/~x)
∧ αS0((w)j/~x, (w)j+1/~y)) ∧ ~y = (w)i
then set
α∗S(i, ~x, ~y) ::= ∃w CS(i, w, ~x, ~y)
and finally define
αS(~x, ~y) ::= ∃i α∗S(i, ~x, ~y) ∧ ¬B(~y/~x).
Note that, in Definition 4.1.1, the definitions of AMS and αS(~x, ~y) proceed
simultaneously by induction on S, in that for the iteration case, ϕS0(~x, y, ~z)
is constructed from αS0 , and the definition of A
M
S refers to ϕS0(~x, y, ~z); for
the role of ϕS0(~x, y, ~z), we shall show in Claim 4.1.5 that any sequence ~x0,
~x1, . . . , ~xi of vectors of numbers of M such that M |= ∀j ≤ i ϕS0(v(~x), j, ~xj)
is M -finite. Note also that a particular M -finite sequence of vectors of
numbers of M is adopted here rather than the more natural one, that is the
sequence ~x0, ~x1, . . . , ~xi such that M |= ~x0 = ~x ∧ ∀j < i αS0( ~xj , ~xj+1) with
i, ~x ∈M , because it has not been proved or disproved that the latter can be
coded as a number of M by extended coding functions. (If such a sequence
satisfies the induction axioms for all formulas, then it is M -finite; for more
details, cf. Definition 4.3.2 and Theorem 4.3.5.)
Proposition 4.1.2. For every S ∈WP , it is the case that in PA, αS(~x, ~y)
and ϕS(~x, y, ~z) are logically equivalent to a Σ1-formula.
Proof. Let S ∈WP . It’s easy to check, by induction on S, that αS(~x, ~y) and
ϕS(~x, y, ~z) are generalized Σ1-formulas, so, in PA, each is logically equivalent
to a Σ1-formula.
Definition 4.1.3. For every S ∈ WP and every M |= PA, ~y = gMS (~x) is
defined such that for any ~a,~b ∈M , gMS (~a) = ~b⇔ Ev, v′(v(~x) = ~a & v′(~x) =
~b & (v, v′) ∈ AMS ).
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Theorem 4.1.4. For every S ∈ WP and every M |= PA, ~y = gMS (~x) is a
function such that for any ~a,~b ∈M , gMS (~a) = ~b iff M |= αS(~a,~b).
Proof. To prove the theorem, by Definition 4.1.3, it suffices to prove that, for
every S ∈WP and every M |= PA, (v, v′) ∈ AMS iff M |= αS(v(~x), v′(~x)) in
(a), and M |= ∀~x, ~y, ~z(αS(~x, ~y) ∧ αS(~x, ~z/~y)→ ~y = ~z) in (b). Fix M |= PA.
The argument proceeds by induction on S.
Assignment: S ≡ xi := E.
(a) Consider (v, v′) ∈ AMS as follows: by the definition of AMS , it is
equivalent to v′(xi) = EM,v & A 1 ≤ j ≤ n, j 6= i v′(xj) = v(xj); then it is
equivalent to M |= v′(xi) = E(v(~x)/~x) & A 1 ≤ i ≤ n, j 6= i v′(xj) = v(xj);
by the definition of αS(~x, ~y), it is equivalent to M |= αS(v(~x), v′(~x)).
(b) It’s trivial that M |= ∀~x, ~y, ~z(αS(~x, ~y) ∧ αS(~x, ~z/~y)→ ~y = ~z).
Composition: S ≡ S1;S2.
(a) Consider (v, v′) ∈ AMS as follows: by the definition of AMS , it is
equivalent to (v, v′) ∈ AMS1 ◦ AMS2 ; by the definition of ◦, it is equivalent to
Ev′′ [ (v, v′′) ∈ AMS1 & (v′′, v′) ∈ AMS2 ]; by the induction hypothesis, it is
equivalent to E v′′ [ M |= αS1(v(~x), v′′(~x)) & M |= αS2(v′′(~x), v′(~x)) ]; by
the definition of αS(~x, ~y), it is equivalent to M |= αS(v(~x), v′(~x)).
(b) Applying the induction hypothesis to S1 (resp. S2) yields M |=
∀~x, ~y, ~z(αS1(~x, ~y) ∧ αS1(~x, ~z/~y) → ~y = ~z) (resp. M |= ∀~x, ~y, ~z(αS2(~x, ~y) ∧
αS2(~x, ~z/~y) → ~y = ~z)). By the definition of αS(~x, ~y), we have that M |=
∀~x, ~y, ~z(αS(~x, ~y) ∧ αS(~x, ~z/~y)→ ~y = ~z).
Conditional: S ≡ if B then S1 else S2 fi.
(a) Consider (v, v′) ∈ AMS as follows: by the definition of AMS , it is
equivalent to M,v |= B & (v, v′) ∈ AMS1 | M,v 6|= B & (v, v′) ∈ AMS2 ;
by the induction hypothesis, it is equivalent to M |= B(v(~x)) & M |=
αS1(v(~x), v
′(~x)) | M 6|= B(v(~x)) & M |= αS2(v(~x), v′(~x)); by the definition
of αS(~x, ~y), it is equivalent to M |= αS(v(~x), v′(~x)).
(b) Similar to the composition case.
Iteration: S ≡ while B do S0 od.
We begin with
Claim 4.1.5. Let i, ~x, ~x0, ~x1, . . . , ~xi ∈ M with M |= ∀j ≤ i ϕS0(~x, j, ~xj).
Then it is the case that
(1) M |= ∀j ≤ i(∃!~z ϕS0(~x, j, ~z) ∧ ϕS0(~x, j, ~xj));
(2) M |= ∃w,∀j ≤ i (w)j = ~xj.
The proof of Claim 4.1.5 is shown as follows:
Proof of (1). By the premise, it suffices to prove the uniqueness of ~z in
M |= ∀j ≤ i,∃~z ϕS0(~x, j, ~z). suppose
j ≤ i, w,w′ ∈M |= (w)0 = (w′)0 = ~x ∧ ∀k < j αS0((w)k, (w)k+1)
∧ ∀k < j αS0((w′)k, (w′)k+1),
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by the induction hypothesis we have M |= ∀~x, ~y, ~z(αS0(~x, ~y)∧αS0(~x, ~z/~y)→
~y = ~z), then by induction on k up to j we can see that M |= ∀k ≤ j (w)k =
(w′)k and hence in particular M |= (w)j = (w′)j , so it follows that M |=
∀j ≤ i, ~z, ~z′(ϕS0(~x, j, ~z) ∧ ϕS0(~x, j, ~z′)→ ~z = ~z′).
Proof of (2). Immediate from (1) and Theorem 3.4.
We next give the main proof of this case:
(a) Consider (v, v′) ∈ AMS as follows: by the definition of AMS , it is
equivalent to E i, ~x0, ~x1, . . . , ~xi ∈ M [ M |= ∀j ≤ i ϕS0(v(~x), j, ~xj) &
v(~x) = ~x0 & A j < i ( M,v( ~xj/~x) |= B & (v( ~xj/~x), v( ~xj+1/~x)) ∈ AMS0 )
& v′(~x) = ~xi & M, v′ 6|= B ]; by the induction hypothesis, it is equivalent
to E i, ~x0, ~x1, . . . , ~xi ∈ M [ M |= ∀j ≤ i ϕS0(v(~x), j, ~xj) & v(~x) = ~x0 &
M |= ∀j < i(B( ~xj) ∧ αS0( ~xj , ~xj+1)) & v′(~x) = ~xi & M 6|= B(v′(~x)) ]; using
Claim 4.1.5, it is equivalent to E i, w ∈M [ M |= v(~x) = (w)0 & M |= ∀j <
i(B((w)j) ∧ αS0((w)j , (w)j+1)) & M |= v′(~x) = (w)i & M 6|= B(v′(~x)) ]; by
the definition of αS(~x, ~y), it is equivalent to M |= αS(v(~x), v′(~x)).
(b) Suppose ~a,~b,~c ∈ M with M |= αS(~a,~b) ∧ αS(~a,~c). Then we have to
prove that ~b = ~c. By the supposition, together with the definition of αS ,
there exist i, w, i′, w′ ∈M such that
M |= ~a = (w)0 ∧ ∀j < i(B((w)j)
∧ αS0((w)j , (w)j+1)) ∧~b = (w)i ∧ ¬B(~b) (1)
and
M |= ~a = (w′)0 ∧ ∀j < i′(B((w′)j)
∧ αS0((w′)j , (w′)j+1)) ∧ ~c = (w′)i′ ∧ ¬B(~c). (2)
To prove ~b = ~c, by (1) and (2), it is enough to prove that i = i′ and
M |= (w)i = (w′)i′ . By the order relation of M (cf. Lemma 2.1.1), it
follows that i ≤M i′ or i′ ≤M i. Without loss of generality, let i ≤M i′.
By (1) and (2), we have that M |= (w)0 = (w′)0. Suppose j <M i and
M |= (w)j = (w′)j , then by the induction hypothesis we immediately have
M |= ∀~x, ~y, ~z(αS0(~x, ~y) ∧ αS0(~x, ~z/~y) → ~y = ~z) and hence by (1), (2) it
follows that M |= (w)j+1 = (w′)j+1, so we can see M |= ∀j ≤ i (w)j = (w′)j
by induction on j up to i. Suppose for a contradiction that i <M i′. This,
together with (2), implies M |= B((w′)i). From (1), we immediately have
M 6|= B((w)i). This, together with the fact M |= (w)i = (w′)i, implies
M 6|= B((w′)i), a contradiction. Thus we have i = i′ and finally it follows
that M |= (w)i = (w′)i′ .
Note that in the proof of Theorem 4.1.4, the proof for that (v, v′) ∈ AMS
iff M |= αS(v(~x), v′(~x)), and the proof for that M |= ∀~x, ~y, ~z(αS(~x, ~y) ∧
αS(~x, ~z/~y)→ ~y = ~z) proceed simultaneously by induction on S, in that for
the iteration case, the proof for that (v, v′) ∈ AMS iff M |= αS(v(~x), v′(~x))
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employs Claim 4.1.5, whose proof uses the induction hypothesisM |= ∀~x, ~y, ~z(αS0(~x, ~y)∧
αS0(~x, ~z/~y)→ ~y = ~z).
Let S ≡ while B do S0 od and M |= PA. The X-semantics of while-
programs (cf. Definition 4.1.1) shows that every run ~x0, ~x1, . . . , ~xi of S
in M should satisfy the constraint M |= ∀j ≤ i ϕS0( ~x0, j, ~xj). By Claim
4.1.5, on giving the input ~x0, this run will be uniquely determined by the
constraint. Thus the natural way to decide whether a given sequence ~x0, ~x1,
. . . , ~xi ∈ M (typically given by a formula with the argument ~x0) is a run
of S is to prove M |= ∀j ≤ i ϕS0( ~x0, j, ~xj) by induction on j up to i in the
formula ϕS0( ~x0, j, ~xj) using Lemmas 2.2.3 and 2.2.5.
Proposition 4.1.6. Let ψ(~x, ~y) ∈ L and M |= PA with M |= ∀~x, ~y, ~z(ψ(~x, ~y)∧
ψ(~x, ~z)→ ~y = ~z). Then for any ~x ∈M , we have that either
M |= ∀i,∃w((w)0 = ~x ∧ ∀j < i ψ((w)j , (w)j+1)) (3)
or
M |= ∃i, w((w)0 = ~x ∧ ∀j < i ψ((w)j , (w)j+1) ∧ ¬∃~z ψ((w)i, ~z)). (4)
Proof. Fix ~x ∈ M . Suppose that (3) doesn’t hold. Then we have to prove
(4). By the supposition, we have that M |= ∃i,¬∃w((w)0 = ~x ∧ ∀j <
i ψ((w)j , (w)j+1)). Using the least number principle (cf. the Preliminaries),
there exists i ∈M such that
M |= ¬∃w((w)0 = ~x ∧ ∀j < i ψ((w)j , (w)j+1)) (5)
and
M |= ∀k < i,∃w((w)0 = ~x ∧ ∀j < k ψ((w)j , (w)j+1)). (6)
Then M |= i > 0, otherwise contradicting (5) using Lemma 2.2.5, and
hence by (6) there exists w ∈ M such that M |= (w)0 = ~x ∧ ∀j < i −
1 ψ((w)j , (w)j+1). To prove (4), it suffices to prove M |= ¬∃~z ψ((w)i−1, ~z).
Assume for a contradiction that M 2 ¬∃~z ψ((w)i−1, ~z). Then there exists
~z ∈ M such that M |= ψ((w)i−1, ~z), using Lemmas 2.2.3 and 2.2.5 there
exists w′ ∈ M such that M |= ∀j < i (w′)j = (w)j ∧ (w′)i = ~z, hence
M |= (w′)0 = ~x∧∀j < i ψ((w′)j , (w′)j+1), a contradiction to (5), and so (4)
holds.
Corollary 4.1.7. Let M |= PA, v be an assignment over M , and S ::=
while B do S0 od with S0 ∈ WP . Then either of the following two cases
holds.
(1) A i ∈ M , E ~x0, ~x1, . . . , ~xi ∈ M [ M |= ∀j ≤ i ϕS0(v(~x), j, ~xj) &
v(~x) = ~x0 & A j < i (v( ~xj/~x), v( ~xj+1/~x)) ∈ AMS0 ];
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(2) E i, ~x0, ~x1, . . . , ~xi ∈ M [ M |= ∀j ≤ i ϕS0(v(~x), j, ~xj) & v(~x) = ~x0 &
A j < i (v( ~xj/~x), v( ~xj+1/~x)) ∈ AMS0 & ∼ E ~z ∈M (v(~xi/~x), v(~z/~x)) ∈
AMS0 ].
Proof. By Proposition 4.1.6, the definition of ϕS0 (cf. Definition 4.1.1),
and the fact that for any S ∈ WP and any M |= PA, (v, v′) ∈ AMS iff
M |= αS(v(~x), v′(~x)), and M |= ∀~x, ~y, ~z(αS(~x, ~y) ∧ αS(~x, ~z/~y)→ ~y = ~z) (cf.
Theorem 4.1.4).
Observe from Corollary 4.1.7 that in Definition 4.1.1, for the iteration
case, the definition of AMS , though restricted, can still exhaust the sequences
of vectors of numbers of M computable by S0 that we are concerned with.
Proposition 4.1.8 (The induction of M -finiteness). Let ~x, ~y, ~z ∈M |= PA
and S0 ∈WP . Then it is the case that
(i) M |= ϕS0(~x, 0, ~y)↔ ~x = ~y;
(ii) M |= ϕS0(~x, i, ~y) ∧ αS0(~y, ~z)↔ ϕS0(~x, i+ 1, ~z).
Proof. (i) Consider M |= ϕS0(~x, 0, ~y) as follows: by the definition of ϕS0 ,
it is equivalent to saying that there exists w ∈ M such that M |= (w)0 =
~x ∧ (w)0 = ~y; using Lemmas 2.2.3 and 2.2.5, it is equivalent to M |= ~x = ~y.
(ii) Consider M |= ϕS0(~x, i, ~y) ∧ αS0(~y, ~z) as follows. By the definition
of ϕS0 , it is equivalent to saying that there exists w ∈ M such that M |=
(w)0 = ~x ∧ ∀j < i αS0((w)j , (w)j+1) ∧ (w)i = ~y ∧ αS0(~y, ~z). Using Lemmas
2.2.3 and 2.2.5, it is equivalent to saying that there exist w,w′ ∈ M such
that M |= (w)0 = ~x ∧ ∀j < i αS0((w)j , (w)j+1) ∧ (w)i = ~y ∧ αS0(~y, ~z) and
M |= ∀j < i+ 1 (w′)j = (w)j ∧ (w′)i+1 = ~z. Using Claim 4.1.5 (⇐. Let w =
w′. (w)i is the unique value of ~y), it is equivalent to saying that there exists
w′ ∈M such that M |= (w′)0 = ~x∧∀j < i+1 αS0((w′)j , (w′)j+1)∧(w′)i+1 =
~z. By the definition of ϕS0 , it is equivalent to M |= ϕS0(~x, i+ 1, ~z).
Corollary 4.1.9 (The induction of loop programs). Let ~x, ~y, ~z ∈M |= PA,
and S ::= while B do S0 od with S0 ∈WP . Then it is the case that
(i) M |= α∗S(0, ~x, ~y)↔ ~x = ~y;
(ii) M |= α∗S(i, ~x, ~y) ∧ (B(~y/~x) ∧ αS0(~y/~x, ~z/~y))↔ α∗S(i+ 1, ~x, ~z/~y).
Proof. By Proposition 4.1.8, together with the definitions of ϕS0 and α
∗
S (cf.
Definition 4.1.1).
4.2 Comparison with the standard semantics
In this subsection, the connections between the standard semantics and
X-semantics of while-programs are built: to illustrate the similarity and
difference of the two semantics, an example is shown; for the general rela-
tionship of the two semantics, two propositions are given ; the reasons why
the standard semantics is “complex” in logic are discussed.
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Example 4.2.1 (Identity functions). Let S ::= y := 0;while y < x do y :=
y + 1 od. For every x, y ∈ N , fNS (x, y) = gNS (x, y) = (x, x). For every
nonstandard M |= PA, and every x, y ∈ M , fMS (x, y) = (x, x) if x is a
standard number of M , and fMS is undefined for (x, y) otherwise; in contrast,
gMS (x, y) = (x, x).
Proof. Fix x, y ∈ M |= PA. The value of fMS for the input (x, y) is easy
to calculate. It remains to show that gMS (x, y) = (x, x). Let S0 ::= y :=
y + 1. To prove gMS (x, y) = (x, x), by X-semantics of while-programs (cf.
Definition 4.1.1), it suffices to prove thatM |= ∀y ≤ x ϕS0((x, 0), y, (x, y)) by
induction on y up to x in the formula ϕS0((x, 0), y, (x, y)). Using Lemmas
2.2.3 and 2.2.5, we have M |= ∃w (w)0 = (x, 0), so it follows that M |=
ϕS0((x, 0), 0, (x, 0)). Suppose x > y ∈M and M |= ϕS0((x, 0), y, (x, y)). By
definition of ϕS0 , there exists w ∈ M such that M |= (w)0 = (x, 0) ∧ ∀j <
y αS0((w)j , (w)j+1) ∧ (w)y = (x, y). Using Lemmas 2.2.3 and 2.2.5, there is
w′ ∈ M such that M |= ∀j < y + 1 (w′)j = (w)j ∧ (w′)y+1 = (x, y + 1), so
M |= ϕS0((x, 0), y + 1, (x, y + 1)) follows.
Proposition 4.2.2. For every S ∈WP , RNS = ANS .
Proof. Let S ∈ WP . To prove RNS = ANS , by Theorem 4.1.4, it suffices to
prove that (v, v′) ∈ RNS iff N |= αS(v(~x), v′(~x)), which is easy for the reader
to verify.
Proposition 4.2.3. Let M |= PA be nonstandard. For every S ∈ WP ,
RMS ⊆ AMS . Moreover, for particular choices of S, both RMS = AMS and
RMS $ AMS are able to hold.
Proof. Let S ∈ WP . The proof for RMS ⊆ AMS proceeds by induction on
S: the cases for assignment, composition and conditional are easy; for the
iteration case, by Theorem 4.1.4, it suffices to prove that (v, v′) ∈ RMS ⇒
M |= αS(v(~x), v′(~x)); this is the case due to Corollary 4.1.9. Moreover, for
S ≡ x := x+ 1, we have that RMS = AMS ; for S as defined in Example 4.2.1,
we can see that RMS $ AMS .
Perhaps the most significant difference between the two semantics is
that the X-semantics in nonstandard models is “simple” (or equivalently
Σ1-definable) while the standard semantics in nonstandard models is not
always so. It appears that Robinson’s Overspill Lemma, which says that
the finiteness in N (defined by Ei ∈ N) is not arithmetical, leads to this.
Actually, the finiteness in N is not defined in first-order logic: introducing
more first-order ingredients into PA is of no help.
Theorem 4.2.4 (Undefinability of the finiteness in N). The set of standard
numbers is not defined in first-order logic.
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Proof. Suppose that T is any first-order consistent extension of PA. Then
we have to prove that the set of standard numbers is not defined in T .
Assume for a contradiction that there exists θ(x) in the language of T that
defines the set of standard numbers in all models of T . As in the existence
proof of nonstandard models of arithmetic, add a constant∞ to the language
of T and apply the Compactness Theorem [17, Theorem 12.15] to the theory
T ∪ {θ(∞)} ∪ {∞ 6= n : n ∈ N}
to conclude that it has a model. The denotation of ∞ in any such model
will be a nonstandard element, contradicting the assumption.
4.3 Comparison with the Hungary semantics
By a labeled program we understand a finite sequence of commands of the
type (i : u) (i ∈ N is the label, and u is either an assignment statement
x ←↩ E or a conditional goto statement if B goto j, where E, B are de-
fined as for while-programs, and j ∈ N), in which no two members have
the same label. Formally, a labeled program P can be written as P =
< (i0, u0), (i1, u1), . . . , (in, un) >, where Aa < b ≤ n ia 6= ib. Let M |= PA.
A trace of P in M is a sequence s ::=< ~sa >a∈M indexed by the elements
of M such that ~sa is a vector of numbers of M assigned to the program
variables of P (including the control variable λ used to denote the labels),
and s is a run of P ; P is said to halt at ~si if ~si(λ) 6∈ {im : m ≤ n} and
Aj ≥M i ~sj = ~si. (For more details, the reader refers to [10].)
Definition 4.3.1 (Cf. [10, pp165]). Let M |= PA. The sequence <
~sa >a∈M in M is continuous if it satisfies the induction axiom scheme, that
is, for any ϕ(~x) ∈ L,
M |= ϕ(~s0) ∧ ∀x(ϕ(~sx)→ ϕ( ~sx+1))→ ∀x ϕ(~sx).
By a continuous trace of P in M we understand a trace < ~sa >a∈M of
P which is continuous. The semantics of labeled programs over continuous
traces is called the Hungary semantics.
Note that a continuous sequence in M is M -infinite, which means that
it is indexed by all elements of M , so it might not be coded as a number
by extended coding functions (consider, e.g., the sequence < a >a∈M ). As
while-programs are structured (by contrast labeled programs are unstruc-
tured), this definition of continuous sequences (cf. Definition 4.3.1) is not
appropriate for building the continuous semantics of while-programs. In the
present context, we prefer to adopt the following definition of continuous
sequences.
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Definition 4.3.2. Let i ∈ M |= PA. A pseudo-M -finite sequence ~a0, ~a1,
. . ., ~ai of vectors of numbers of M is M -continuous if it satisfies the induction
axiom scheme, that is, for any ϕ(~x, y, ~z) ∈ L and any ~x ∈M ,
M |= ϕ(~x, 0, ~a0)∧∀j < i(ϕ(~x, j, ~aj)→ ϕ(~x, j+1, ~aj+1))→ ∀j ≤ i ϕ(~x, j, ~aj).
It is inessential that the parameters ~x, y in ϕ(~x, y, ~z) are explicit in Def-
inition 4.3.2, yet not in Definition 4.3.1. In particular, every finite sequence
of vectors of natural numbers is N -continuous.
Proposition 4.3.3. Every countable nonstandard model M of PA has an
M -continuous sequence of numbers that cannot be coded as a number by
extended β-function.
Proof. Let i ∈ M be nonstandard. Consider the set A = { < a0, a1, . . .,
ai > : a0 = 0, a1 = 1, and for each 2 ≤ j ≤ i, aj = 0 or 1 }. It’s easy to
check that each element of A is M -continuous. Note that A is uncountable.
However, M has only countably many elements used as codes. This means
that one of elements of A can’t be coded as a number of M by extended
β-function.
Proposition 4.3.4. Let M |= PA. Every M -finite sequence ~a0, ~a1, . . ., ~ai
of vectors of numbers of M is M -continuous.
Proof. Follows from the definition of M -finiteness (cf. Definition 3.3) and
the induction axiom scheme of PA.
Observe from Theorem 3.4 and Propositions 4.3.3, 4.3.4 that the concept
of M -finiteness is strictly less than that of M -continuousness (in symbols,
M -finiteness < M -continuousness).
In order to distinguish from the known semantics of while-programs,
for the continuous semantics of while-programs, we use CMS to denote the
input-output relation of S ∈ WP in M |= PA. For any S ∈ WP and
any M |= PA, CMS is defined as in the standard semantics except for the
iteration case:
(v, v′) ∈ CMwhile B do S0 od⇔ E an M -continuous sequence ~x0, . . ., ~xi ∈M
[ v(~x) = ~x0 & Aj < i(M,v( ~xj/~x) |= B & (v( ~xj/~x), v( ~xj+1/~x)) ∈ CMS0 ) &
v′ = v(~xi/~x) & M,v′ 6|= B ].
It’s not difficult to prove the equivalence of the Hungary semantics to
the continuous semantics of while-programs: the equivalence in N is shown
in [21, Section 3-3.1]; and similarly for nonstandard models. To show the
equivalence of the Hungary semantics to the X-semantics of while-programs,
it suffices to show the equivalence of the continuous semantics to the X-
semantics.
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Theorem 4.3.5. Let M |= PA and ψ(~x, ~y) ∈ L with M |= ∀~x, ~y, ~z(ψ(~x, ~y)∧
ψ(~x, ~z) → ~y = ~z). Every M -continuous sequence ~a0, ~a1, . . . , ~ai of vectors of
numbers of M with M |= ∀j < i ψ(~aj , ~aj+1) can be coded as a number of M
by extended coding functions.
Proof. Let ϕ(~x, y, ~z) ::= ∃w((w)0 = ~x∧∀u < y ψ((w)u, (w)u+1)∧ (w)y = ~z).
Using Lemmas 2.2.3 and 2.2.5, it’s easy to see that M |= ϕ( ~a0, 0, ~a0) ∧
∀j < i(ϕ( ~a0, j, ~aj) → ϕ( ~a0, j + 1, ~aj+1)). Since the sequence ~a0, ~a1, . . . , ~ai
is M -continuous, we have that M |= ϕ( ~a0, 0, ~a0) ∧ ∀j < i(ϕ( ~a0, j, ~aj) →
ϕ( ~a0, j + 1, ~aj+1)) → ∀j ≤ i ϕ( ~a0, j, ~aj). Then it follows that M |= ∀j ≤
i ϕ( ~a0, j, ~aj). It’s easy to prove, similar to the proof of Claim 4.1.5 (1), that
M |= ∀j ≤ i,∀~s,~t(ϕ( ~a0, j, ~s)∧ϕ( ~a0, j,~t)→ ~s = ~t). Then we have M |= ∀j ≤
i(∃!~z ϕ( ~a0, j, ~z)∧ϕ( ~a0, j, ~aj)). By Theorem 3.4, it follows that ~a0, ~a1, . . . , ~ai
can be coded as a number of M by extended coding functions.
Note that, in Theorem 4.3.5, the premiseM |= ∀~x, ~y, ~z(ψ(~x, ~y)∧ψ(~x, ~z)→
~y = ~z) is essential for the conclusion to hold. Let ψ(x, y) ::= y = 0 ∨ y = 1.
Let A be as defined in the proof of Proposition 4.3.3. It’s trivial that each
element < a0, a1, . . . , ai > of A satisfies M |= ∀j < i ψ(~aj , ~aj+1). However,
one of elements of A can’t be coded as a number of M by extended coding
functions.
Theorem 4.3.6. For every S ∈WP and every M |= PA, AMS = CMS .
Proof. Let S ∈ WP and let M |= PA. The proof of AMS = CMS proceeds
by induction on S. The cases for assignment, composition and conditional
are easy. For the iteration case, let S ≡ while B do S0 od with S0 ∈ WP .
To prove AMS = C
M
S , it suffices to prove that A
M
S ⊆ CMS and AMS ⊇ CMS .
By Claim 4.1.5, together with Proposition 4.3.4, it’s easy to see that AMS ⊆
CMS . To prove A
M
S ⊇ CMS , by Theorem 4.1.4, it suffices to prove that
(v, v′) ∈ CMS ⇒ M |= αS(v(~x), v′(~x)). Suppose that (v, v′) ∈ CMS . Then
we have to prove that M |= αS(v(~x), v′(~x)). By the definition of CMS , we
have that E an M -continuous sequence ~x0, . . ., ~xi ∈ M [ v(~x) = ~x0 &
Aj < i(M,v( ~xj/~x) |= B & (v( ~xj/~x), v( ~xj+1/~x)) ∈ CMS0 ) & v′ = v(~xi/~x) &
M,v′ 6|= B ]. By the induction hypothesis, together with Theorem 4.1.4, it
follows that (v, v′) ∈ CMS0 ⇔ M |= αS0(v(~x), v′(~x)). Then we have that E an
M -continuous sequence ~x0, . . ., ~xi ∈ M [ v(~x) = ~x0 & Aj < i(M |= B( ~xj)
& M |= αS0( ~xj , ~xj+1)) & v′(~x) = ~xi & M 6|= B(v′(~x)) ]. By Theorem 4.3.5,
together with the fact M |= ∀~x, ~y, ~z(αS0(~x, ~y) ∧ αS0(~x, ~z) → ~y = ~z) (cf.
Theorem 4.1.4), we have that E i, w ∈M [ M |= v(~x) = (w)0 & M |= ∀j <
i(B((w)j) ∧ αS0((w)j , (w)j+1)) & M |= v′(~x) = (w)i & M 6|= B(v′(~x)) ]. By
the definition of αS , it follows that M |= αS(v(~x), v′(~x)).
Summarizing the above results, we conclude that the X-semantics of
while-programs is equivalent to the Hungary semantics. Moreover, the use of
M -finiteness in the definition of the nonstandard semantics has an advantage
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over the use of M -continuousness: M -finiteness enables us to construct a
Σ1-formula to uniquely determine the sequence of computation, whereas in
the Hungary semantics, we have to verify whether a sequence satisfies the
induction axioms for all formulas.
5 Soundness and completeness of Hoare logic
5.1 Soundness and Completenss of HL(T )
Definition 5.1.1. Given a model M |= PA and an asserted program
{p}S{q}, {p}S{q} is satisfied at M w.r.t. the X-semantics, denoted
M |=X {p}S{q},
iff for every assignment v over M ,
M,v |= p⇒ Av′((v, v′) ∈ AMS ⇒M, v′ |= q).
Definition 5.1.2. Given a theory PA ⊆ T ⊆ Th(N) and an asserted pro-
gram {p}S{q}, {p}S{q} is satisfied at T w.r.t. the X-semantics, denoted
HL(T ) |=X {p}S{q},
iff for every model M |= T ,
M |=X {p}S{q}.
Definition 5.1.3. Let p ∈ L, S ∈ WP and M |= PA. The strongest
postcondition spMX (p, S) of S relative to p w.r.t. the X-semantics on the set
V of assignments over M is defined by
spMX (p, S) ::= {v ∈ V : Ev′ ∈ V (M, v′ |= p & (v′, v) ∈ AMS )}.
The formal strongest postcondition SP (p, S)(~x) of S relative to p is defined
by
SP (p, S)(~x) ::= ∃~u(p(~u/~x) ∧ αS(~u/~x, ~x/~y)).
Lemma 5.1.4 (Strongest Postcondition Lemma). Let p ∈ L, S ∈WP and
M |= PA. It is the case that
(i) v ∈ spMX (p, S) ⇔ M,v |= SP (p, S);
(ii) M |=X {p}S{SP (p, S)};
(iii) M |=X {p}S{q} ⇔ M |= SP (p, S)→ q.
Proof. Immediate from Theorem 4.1.4.
20
Definition 5.1.5. Let p ∈ L, S ::= while B do S0 od and M |= PA. The
loop invariant invMX (p, S) of S relative to p w.r.t. the X-semantics on the
set V of assignments over M is defined by
invMX (p, S) ::= {v ∈ V : E i, ~x0, ~x1, . . . , ~xi ∈M(M |= ∀j ≤ i ϕS0( ~x0, j, ~xj)
& M, v( ~x0/~x) |= p & A j < i(M,v( ~xj/~x) |= B
& (v( ~xj/~x), v( ~xj+1/~x)) ∈ AMS0) & v(~x) = ~xi)}.
The formal loop invariant INV (p, S)(~x) of S relative to p is defined by
INV (p, S)(~x) ::= ∃~u(p(~u/~x) ∧ ∃i α∗S(i, ~u/~x, ~x/~y)).
Lemma 5.1.6 (Loop Invariant Lemma). Let p ∈ L, S ::= while B do S0 od
and M |= PA. It is the case that
(i) v ∈ invMX (p, S) ⇔ M,v |= INV (p, S)(~x);
(ii) M |= p→ INV (p, S);
(iii) M |=X {INV (p, S) ∧B}S0{INV (p, S)};
(iv) M |=X {p}S{q} ⇔ M |= INV (p, S)(~x) ∧ ¬B(~x)→ q(~x).
Proof. Follows from Theorem 4.1.4 and Corollary 4.1.9.
Definition 5.1.7. Given a theory PA ⊆ T ⊆ Th(N), HL(T ) is sound and
complete w.r.t. the X-semantics iff for any p, q ∈ L and any S ∈WP ,
HL(T ) ` {p}S{q} iff HL(T ) |=X {p}S{q}.
We are now positioned to state the main theorem of this paper.
Theorem 5.1.8 (Soundness and Completeness of HL(T )). Let PA ⊆ T ⊆
Th(N). Then the Hoare logic HL(T ) is sound and complete w.r.t. the
X-semantics. That is, for any p, q ∈ L and any S ∈WP ,
HL(T ) ` {p}S{q} iff HL(T ) |=X {p}S{q}.
Proof. Let p, q ∈ L and S ∈ WP . The proof of this theorem is partitioned
into two parts: the “only if” part (⇒) and the “if” part (⇐).
(⇒). Suppose that HL(T ) ` {p}S{q}. Then we have to prove that
HL(T ) |=X {p}S{q}. The argument proceeds by induction on the length
of the proof of {p}S{q} in HL(T ), where the last step is divided into the
following cases.
Assignment Axiom Scheme: S ≡ xi := E and HL(T ) ` {p}S{q}. By the
Assignment Axiom Scheme, we have that p ≡ q(E/xi). This together with
the X-semantics of S (cf. Definition 4.1.1) gives that HL(T ) |=X {p}S{q}.
Composition Rule: S ≡ S1;S2 and HL(T ) ` {p}S{q}. By the Composi-
tion Rule, there exists r(~x) ∈ L such that HL(T ) ` {p}S1{r} and HL(T ) `
{r}S2{q}. By the induction hypothesis, it follows that HL(T ) |=X {p}S1{r}
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and HL(T ) |=X {r}S2{q}. By the X-semantics of S (cf. Definition 4.1.1),
we have HL(T ) |=X {p}S{q}.
Conditional Rule: S ≡ if B then S1 else S2 fi and HL(T ) ` {p}S{q}.
By the Conditional Rule, we have that HL(T ) ` {p∧B}S1{q} and HL(T ) `
{p ∧ ¬B}S2{q}. By the induction hypothesis, it follows that HL(T ) |=X
{p∧B}S1{q} and HL(T ) |=X {p∧¬B}S2{q}. By the X-semantics of S (cf.
Definition 4.1.1), we have HL(T ) |=X {p}S{q}.
Iteration Rule: S ≡ while B do S0 od and HL(T ) ` {p}S{q}. By the
Iteration Rule, we have that HL(T ) ` {p ∧ B}S0{p} and q ≡ p ∧ ¬B. By
the induction hypothesis, it follows that HL(T ) |=X {p ∧ B}S0{p}. Let
M |= T . By Theorem 4.1.4, we have that M |= p(~x) ∧ B(~x) ∧ αS0(~x, ~y) →
p(~y/~x). Assuming that M |= p(~x) ∧ αS(~x, ~y), by the X-semantics of S (cf.
Definition 4.1.1) and Theorem 4.1.4 there exist i, ~x0 = ~x, ~x1, . . . , ~xi = ~y ∈
M with M |= ∀j ≤ i(∃!~z ϕS0(~x, j, ~z) ∧ ϕS0(~x, j, ~xj)) such that M |= ∀j <
i(B( ~xj) ∧ αS0( ~xj , ~xj+1)) ∧ ¬B(~xi), then by induction on j up to i it’s easy
to see M |= ∀j ≤ i p( ~xj/~x) and hence we have M |= p(~y/~x) ∧ ¬B(~y/~x),
so M |= q(~y/~x). Then M |= p(~x) ∧ αS(~x, ~y) → q(~y/~x). By Theorem 4.1.4,
it follows that M |=X {p}S{q}. Since M |= T is arbitrary, we have that
HL(T ) |=X {p}S{q}.
Consequence Rule: HL(T ) ` {p}S{q}. By the Consequence Rule, there
exist p1, q1 ∈ L such that T ` p→ p1, HL(T ) ` {p1}S{q1} and T ` q1 → q.
By soundness of first-order logic, we have T |= p→ p1 and T |= q1 → q. By
the induction hypothesis, it follows that HL(T ) |=X {p1}S{q1}. Then we
have HL(T ) |=X {p}S{q}.
(⇐). Suppose that HL(T ) |=X {p}S{q}. Then we have to prove that
HL(T ) ` {p}S{q}. The argument is by induction on the structure of S.
Assignment: S ≡ xi := E. Suppose that HL(T ) |=X {p}S{q}. By the
X-semantics of S (cf. Definition 4.1.1), we have that T |= p → q(E/xi).
By completeness of first-order logic, it follows that T ` p → q(E/xi). By
the Assignment Axiom Scheme, we have HL(T ) ` {q(E/xi)}S{q}. By the
Consequence Rule, it follows that HL(T ) ` {p}S{q}.
Composition: S ≡ S1;S2. Suppose that HL(T ) |=X {p}S{q}. By the
Strongest Postcondition Lemma (cf. Lemma 5.1.4), we have thatHL(T ) |=X
{p}S1{SP (p, S1)} and HL(T ) |=X {SP (p, S1)}S2{q}. Applying the in-
duction hypothesis to S1 and S2 yields HL(T ) ` {p}S1{SP (p, S1)} and
HL(T ) ` {SP (p, S1)}S2{q}. By the Composition Rule, it follows that
HL(T ) ` {p}S{q}.
Conditional: S ≡ if B then S1 else S2 fi. Suppose that HL(T ) |=X
{p}S{q}. By the X-semantics of S (cf. Definition 4.1.1), we have that
HL(T ) |=X {p∧B}S1{q} and HL(T ) |=X {p∧¬B}S2{q}. By the induction
hypothesis applied to S1 and S2, it follows that HL(T ) ` {p ∧ B}S1{q}
and HL(T ) ` {p ∧ ¬B}S2{q}. By the Conditional Rule, we have HL(T ) `
{p}S{q}.
Iteration: S ≡ while B do S0 od. Suppose that HL(T ) |= {p}S{q}.
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By the Loop Invariant Lemma (cf. Lemma 5.1.6), it follows that T |=
p → INV (p, S), HL(T ) |=X {INV (p, S) ∧ B}S0{INV (p, S)} and T |=
INV (p, S) ∧ ¬B → q. By completeness of first-order logic, we have that
T ` p→ INV (p, S) and T ` INV (p, S) ∧ ¬B → q. Applying the induction
hypothesis to S0 yields HL(T ) ` {INV (p, S) ∧ B}S0{INV (p, S)}. By the
Iteration Rule, it follows that HL(T ) ` {INV (p, S)}S{INV (p, S) ∧ ¬B}.
By the Consequence Rule, we have that HL(T ) ` {p}S{q}.
This completes the proof.
5.2 Reduction from HL(T ) to T
The reduction from HL(T ) to T with PA ⊆ T ⊆ Th(N) has been estab-
lished by Bergstra and Tucker as the main theorem in [22], and is shown as
follows.
Theorem 5.2.1. Given an assertion p ∈ L and program S ∈ WP one can
effectively calculate an assertion SP (p, S) ∈ L such that
(1) SP (p, S) defines the strongest postcondition of S relative to p on the
set of states over N ;
(2) HL(PA) ` {p}S{SP (p, S)};
And, for any refinement T of Peano arithmetic, including PA itself,
(3) HL(T ) ` {p}S{q} if and only if T ` SP (p, S)→ q.
In Theorem 5.2.1, statement (1) explains the meaning of SP (p, S) in N ;
statement (2) is a preliminary result for statement (3), and it can be taken
as a special case of (3) with SP (p, S) in place of q; (3) is the core, and it
establishes the reduction from HL(T ) to T by using SP (p, S).
The main results having been developed in this paper can be used to
derive the above theorem:
Proof of Theorem 5.2.1. By Theorem 4.1.4 and Proposition 4.2.2, it follows
that for any ~n, ~m ∈ N , fNS (~n) = ~m iff N |= αS(~n, ~m). The formal strongest
postcondition SP (p, S), here, can be defined by SP (p, S)(~x) ::= ∃~u(p(~u/~x)∧
αS(~u/~x, ~x/~y)). Then statement (1) of Theorem 5.2.1 follows. To prove The-
orem 5.2.1, it remains to prove statement (3). Let PA ⊆ T ⊆ Th(N),
p, q ∈ L, and S ∈ WP . Consider HL(T ) ` {p}S{q} as follows: by The-
orem 5.1.8, it is equivalent to HL(T ) |=X {p}S{q}; by Theorem 4.1.4, it
is equivalent to T |= p(~x) ∧ αS(~x, ~y) → q(~y/~x); by definition of SP (p, S),
it is equivalent to T |= SP (p, S) → q; by soundness and completeness of
first-order logic, it is equivalent to T ` SP (p, S)→ q.
Observing the axiom system of HL(T ), we remark that the crucial and
perhaps the most difficult step of finding a proof of {p}S{q} in HL(T ) is to
guess the corresponding intermediate assertions when applying the Compo-
sition and Iteration Rules. As Lemmas 5.1.4, 5.1.6 and the proof of Theorem
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5.1.8 show, the intermediate assertions involved in this proof can be easily
constructed, and their roles in guaranteeing the correctness of Theorem 5.2.1
are implicit. The real strength of Theorem 5.2.1 is due to the fact that it pro-
vides us a readily-operating means to deciding whether {p}S{q} is provable
in HL(T ): one simply needs to decide whether SP (p, S)→ q is provable in
T .
5.3 Comparison with Floyd logic
This Subsection is considered as a continuation to Subsection 4.3. The
following definitions concerning Floyd logic come from [10, p165-166].
Let PA ⊆ T ⊆ Th(N), M |= T , P ::=< (i0 : u0), ..., (in : un) > and
ψ ∈ L.
The dynamic formula (P,ψ) is said to be valid in M w.r.t. continuous
traces if (∗) below holds.
(∗) For any continuous trace < ~sa >a∈M of P in M and for any
a ∈M, ~sa(λ) 6∈ {im : m ≤ n} implies M |= ψ[~sa].
M |= (P,ψ) denotes that (P,ψ) is valid in M w.r.t continuous traces;
T |= (P,ψ) denotes that for every M |= T , M |= (P,ψ).
The Floyd logic serves to derive statements (P,ψ) from T . The set
lab(P ) of labels of P is defined as follows:
lab(P ) ::= {im : m ≤ n+ 1} ∪ {v : ∃m ≤ n(um = if E goto v)}.
A Floyd derivation of (P,ψ) from T consists of: a mapping Φ : lab(P )→ L
together with the classical first-order derivations listed in (i)-(iv) below.
Notation: When z ∈ lab(P ) we write Φz instead of Φ(z).
(i) A derivation: T ` Φi0 .
(ii) To each command im : xj ←↩ E occurring in P , a derivation:
T ` Φim → Φim+1(E/xj).
(iii) To each command im : if B goto v occurring in P , two
derivations: T ` (B ∧Φim)→ Φv and T ` (¬B ∧Φim)→ Φim+1 .
(iv) To each z ∈ (lab(P ) − {im : m ≤ n}), a derivation: T `
Φz → ψ.
Now the existence of a Floyd derivation of (P,ψ) from T is denoted by
T ` (P,ψ). The soundness and completeness of Floyd logic relative to T
has been established by H. Andre´ka, et.al., as the main theorem in [10], and
is shown as follows.
Theorem 5.3.1 (Soundness and completeness of Floyd logic). Let PA ⊆
T ⊆ Th(N). For every labeled program P , and every ψ ∈ L, it is the case
that T ` (P,ψ) iff T |= (P,ψ).
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To build the relationship of Hoare logic with Floyd logic, we remark that
for each S ∈ WP , there is a labeled program P such that the X-semantics
of S is equivalent to the semantics of P in PA, and vice versa.
Theorem 5.3.2. Let PA ⊆ T ⊆ Th(N). For every S ∈WP , every labeled
program P , and every q ∈ L, if the X-semantics of S is equivalent to the
semantics of P in PA, then it is the case that HL(T ) ` {true}S{q} iff
T ` (P, q).
Proof. Immediate from Theorems 5.1.8 and 5.3.1.
Intuitively Hoare logic can be thought of as a special first-order multi-
modal logic with programs viewed as modalities; and the axiom system of
Floyd logic looks more like a first-order logical system. Although these two
axiom systems appear different, they are essentially the same first-order
logical system, as Theorems 5.3.2 and 5.2.1 show.
6 The X-semantics revisited
6.1 Comparison with the axiomatic semantics
The axiomatic semantics of while-programs is a relational semantics deter-
mined by Hoare logic. The following definition is as in [22, p303] except
that the side effects on non-program variables are explicitly ruled out.
Definition 6.1.1. Let L′ be a first-order logical language, let WP ′ be the
set of while-programs based on L′, and let T be a first-order theory of
L′. For any S ∈ WP ′ with program variables ~x, the axiomatic semantics
AX(T )M (S) of S in a model M of T is a binary relation on the set V of
assignments over M defined as follows:
AX(T )M (S) ::= {(σ, τ) ∈ V × V : Ay 6∈ ~x(σ(y) = τ(y)),
Ap, q ∈ L′, v ∈ V (HL(T ) ` {p}S{q}
& M, v(σ(~x)/~x) |= p⇒M, v(τ(~x)/~x) |= q)}.
Observe from the above definition that AX(T )M (S) is the maximal
input-output relation for S over M such that HL(T ) is sound in M with
respect to all the specifications of S. Although this definition of axiomatic
semantics appears mathematically elegant, it is too abstract, and the gen-
eral properties of its are not always nice, e.g. nondeterminism. (For more
details, the reader refers to [22].) Surprisingly, when restricting the first-
order theory T to PA ⊆ T ⊆ Th(N), the axiomatic semantics is exactly
what we pursue in this paper.
Theorem 6.1.2. Let PA ⊆ T ⊆ Th(N). For every M |= T , and every
S ∈WP , AX(T )M (S) = AMS .
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Proof. Let M |= T , let V be the set of assignments over M , and let S ∈WP
with program variables ~x. To prove AX(T )M (S) = A
M
S , it suffices to prove
that AX(T )M (S) ⊇ AMS and AX(T )M (S) ⊆ AMS .
(⊇). Let (σ, τ) ∈ AMS . By Definition 4.1.1, it’s easy to see that Ay 6∈
~x(σ(y) = τ(y)). To prove (σ, τ) ∈ AX(T )M (S), by Definition 6.1.1, it
suffices to prove that Ap, q ∈ L, v ∈ V (HL(T ) ` {p}S{q} & M,v(σ(~x)/~x) |=
p ⇒ M, v(τ(~x)/~x) |= q). Let p, q ∈ L and v ∈ V with HL(T ) ` {p}S{q}
and M,v(σ(~x)/~x) |= p. It remains to show that M,v(τ(~x)/~x) |= q. By
soundness of HL(T ) w.r.t. the X-semantics (cf. Theorem 5.1.8), it follows
that HL(T ) |=X {p}S{q}. Then we haveM |=X {p}S{q}. From the premise
(σ, τ) ∈ AMS , by Definition 4.1.1, it follows that (v(σ(~x)/~x), v(τ(~x)/~x)) ∈
AMS . Since M,v(σ(~x)/~x) |= p, we have that M,v(τ(~x)/~x) |= q.
(⊆). Let (σ, τ) ∈ AX(T )M (S). Let p(~u, ~x) ::= ~u = ~x, q(~u, ~x) ::=
αS(~u, ~x), and v ::= σ(σ(~x)/~u), where ~u is disjoint from ~x. Then we have T |=
p(~u, ~x) ∧ αS(~x, ~y) → q(~u, ~y). By Theorem 4.1.4, it follows that HL(T ) |=X
{p}S{q}. Using completeness ofHL(T ) w.r.t. the X-semantics (cf. Theorem
5.1.8), we have that HL(T ) ` {p}S{q}. By definitions of v and p, we have
that M,v(σ(~x)/~x) |= p. By the definition of AX(T )M (S) (cf. Definition
6.1.1), it follows that Ay 6∈ ~x(σ(y) = τ(y)) and M,v(τ(~x)/~x) |= q. By
definitions of v and q, we have M |= αS(σ(~x), τ(~x)). By Theorem 4.1.4, it
follows that (σ, τ) ∈ AMS .
Observe from the foregoing theorem that the axiomatic semantics of
while-programs on every model of T with PA ⊆ T ⊆ Th(N) is independent
of the choice of T . It has been justified by the Uniqueness Theorem [22,
p304] that in a general setting, the axiomatic semantics of while-programs
on a structure M of a first-order theory T is independent of the choice of
T . We can now say that for any M |= PA, the axiomatic semantics of
while-programs on M coincides with the X-semantics of while-programs on
M .
6.2 Usefulness of nonstandard semantics in Hoare logic
Properties of nonstandard models are sometimes very useful to decide whether
a Hoare’s triple is provable, especially when such a triple is true in the stan-
dard model. Let PA ⊆ T ⊆ Th(N), p, q ∈ L, and S ∈ WP . Suppose that
N |=S {p}S{q} (or equivalently N |=X {p}S{q}) and HL(T ) 6` {p}S{q}.
Then, by Theorem 5.1.8, there should be a nonstandard M |= T such that
M 6|=X {p}S{q}. This means that the X-semantics of while-programs in
M could be useful in deciding whether {p}S{q} is provable in HL(T ). To
show the usefulness of nonstandard semantics in Hoare logic, the following
example is illustrated.
Theorem 6.2.1 (Cf. [16, Theorem 4.3]). Let S ::= y := 0;while y <
x do y := y+1 od, let T ⊇ PA such that Thm(T ) $ Th(N), and let ϕ(x) ∈ L
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such that T ` ϕ(n) for each n ∈ N and T 0 ∀x ϕ(x) (There always exists
such a ϕ for any such T ). It is the case that HL(T ) |=S {¬ϕ(x)}S{false}
but HL(T ) 0 {¬ϕ(x)}S{false}.
Theorem 6.2.1 shows the incompleteness of HL(T ) with T ⊇ PA and
Thm(T ) $ Th(N) w.r.t. the standard semantics. The original proof of
Theorem 6.2.1 in [16, the proof of Theorem 4.3] exploits the proof concept of
HL(T ) to derive a contradiction, yet it seems to be cumbersome. Using the
X-semantics of while-programs, a concise proof of Theorem 6.2.1 is shown
below.
Proof of Theorem 6.2.1. Let S, T and ϕ(x) be as defined in Theorem 6.2.1.
It’s trivial that HL(T ) |=S {¬ϕ(x)}S{false}. Thus it remains to prove
HL(T ) 0 {¬ϕ(x)}S{false}. Since N |=X {¬ϕ(x)}S{false}, by Theo-
rem 5.1.8, it suffices to prove that for some nonstandard M |= T , M 6|=X
{¬ϕ(x)}S{false}. By the definition of ϕ(x), together with completeness
of first-order logic, it follows that there exists a nonstandard M |= T such
that M |= ∃x ¬ϕ(x). Let M be such a model. By Example 4.2.1, we have
that for any x, y ∈ M , gMS (x, y) = (x, x). Then M 6|=X {¬ϕ(x)}S{false}
follows.
7 Remarks on the completeness issues
The most popular completeness form we have known for Hoare logic is the
relative completeness (for a complete knowledge of relative completeness,
the reader refers to the distinguished survey article [1]):
Let L′ be a first-order logical language, and let M be a model
of L′. Hoare logic is complete for while-programs relative to M
iff for all asserted programs Φ, if M |=H Φ, then Th(M) `H Φ,
where |=H and `H denote the satisfaction and derivation rela-
tions of Hoare logic.
Cook [23] considered the relative completeness of Hoare logic with the
expressiveness condition (for the incompleteness due to inexpressiveness,
and the completeness with inexpressiveness, the reader refers to [24] and
[25] respectively):
Let L′ and M be as defined above. If L′ is expressive for while-
programs relative to M (i.e., for all assertions p ∈ L′ and all
while-programs W based on L′, there exists an assertion q ∈ L′
that defines the strongest postcondition of W relative to p on
the set of assignments over M), then Hoare logic is complete for
while-programs relative to M .
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Unfortunately, there are only two kinds of expressive structures for while-
programs w.r.t. the standard semantics: the standard model N and finite
structures [26]. In contrast, as Theorem 4.1.4 and Lemmas 5.1.4, 5.1.6 im-
ply, L is expressive for while-programs w.r.t. the X-semantics relative to
every model of PA, so the new semantics of Hoare logic extends the appli-
cability of Cook’s completeness theorem from N to nonstandard models of
PA. Except for the paucity of expressive structures, the relative complete-
ness of Hoare logic has a theoretical weakness that we can’t come to terms
with: for each expressive structure M it has to pick out the complete theory
Th(M) as the specification axioms to derive the whole set of true asserted
programs in M . Consider for example the case M ≡ N . Let T ⊇ PA with
Thm(T ) $ Th(N). Then there exists a sentence p ∈ L such that N |= p
and T 0 p. It’s easy to see that N |=S {true}x := x{p} (or equivalently
N |=X {true}x := x{p}) and HL(T ) 0 {true}x := x{p} (by the choice of p
and completeness of first-order logic, there exists M |= T such that M 2 p;
then we have HL(T ) 2X {true}x := x{p}; by completeness of HL(T ) w.r.t.
the X-semantics, it follows that HL(T ) 0 {true}x := x{p}). From the above
analysis, we achieve that Th(N) is the only extension T of PA such that
HL(T ) is complete relative to N w.r.t. both the standard semantics and
the X-semantics. However, by Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem, Th(N) is
not recursively enumerable (even not arithmetical [17, Lemma 17.3]), which
means that it is far beyond the power of any mechanical device to enumer-
ate the elements of Th(N). To fix up this drawback, we have studied the
completeness issues of Hoare logic relative to N by restricting assertions to
subclasses of arithmetical formulas [27] (and by restricting inputs to N [28]):
arithmetical extensions of PA suffice to act as the assertion theory, and the
lower the level of the assertions in the arithmetical hierarchy the lower the
level of the required assertion theory is.
Historically, logical completeness of the first-order Hoare logic, which
as an important completeness form stems from completeness of first-order
logic, was studied extensively:
Let L′ be a first-order logical language, and let T be a first-order
theory of L′. Hoare logic is complete for while-programs relative
to T iff for all asserted programs Φ, if T |=H Φ, then T `H Φ,
where T |=H Φ denotes that for any M |= T , M |=H Φ.
Bergstra and Tucker [25] have pointed out that Th(N) is the unique ex-
tension T of PA for which HL(T ) is logically complete w.r.t. the standard
semantics. (The incompleteness of HL(T ) with T ⊇ PA and Thm(T ) $
Th(N) w.r.t. the standard semantics has been shown in Theorem 6.2.1.)
To remedy this unsatisfying completeness result, we have investigated the
logical completeness of Hoare logic with inputs over the standard model
[29]: a particular extension PA+ of PA suffices to prove all valid Hoare’s
triples requiring that the input has a standard value; moreover PA+ is
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shown to be minimal with the property. To see the essential difference of
the completeness theorem of Bergstra and Tucker from that presented in
this paper, we remark that the only factor leading to the difference is the
semantics. Let T ⊇ PA with Thm(T ) $ Th(N). By Propositions 4.2.2 and
4.2.3, for any M |= T , and any S ∈ WP , we have that RMS is a (some-
times proper) subset of AMS . By the semantics of Hoare logic, it follows that
{{p}S{q} : p, q ∈ L, S ∈ WP,HL(T ) |=X {p}S{q}} is properly contained
in {{p}S{q} : p, q ∈ L, S ∈ WP,HL(T ) |=S {p}S{q}}. As is shown in Sub-
section 6.1, the X-semantics of while-programs is an axiomatic semantics,
which means that for any M |= PA and any S ∈ WP , AMS is the maxi-
mal input-output relation for S over M such that HL(T ) is sound in M
with respect to all the specifications of S (in contrast, RMS is not always
maximal in this sense). Hence among all the semantics of while-programs
that make HL(T ) sound in every model of T (including the standard se-
mantics), the axiomatic semantics makes the set {{p}S{q} : p, q ∈ L, S ∈
WP,HL(T ) |=X {p}S{q}} be minimal and naturally coincide with the set
{{p}S{q} : p, q ∈ L, S ∈ WP,HL(T ) ` {p}S{q}}. Furthermore, Bergstra
and Tucker established the logical completeness of Hoare logic based on the
axiomatic semantics in a general setting [16].
The Hungary School [8, 9, 10] provides an alternative approach to char-
acterizing the maximal semantics of programs for which Floyd logic is sound,
i.e. the Hungary semantics, and shows that Floyd logic is logically complete
w.r.t. this semantics. In Subsections 4.3 and 5.3, a detailed comparison of
this technique with that presented in this paper has been given. Csirmaz
[11], and Hortala´-Gonza´lez et.al. [13] extended this technique into a general
situation. For the relationship of the general Floyd logic with weak second
order logic, the reader refers to the literature [15]. Moreover, Andre´ka et.al.
[12], and Pasztor [14] used many-sorted logic (i.e. Henkin semantics [30]) to
define Floyd-Hoare logic, thus obtaining the completeness of Floyd-Hoare
logic immediately from that of many-sorted logic.
Kozen and Tiuryn [31] viewed Hoare logic as a special propositional
modal logic by abstracting assertions and programs to propositional sym-
bols, and gained the completeness of this propositional Hoare logic.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, for nonstandard models M of PA, we have introduced the
concept of M -finiteness as the desired finiteness as far as M is concerned;
we have exhibited an explicit axiomatic semantics for while-programs in
nonstandard models of PA, and proven that it coincides with the Hungary
semantics; based on this semantics, we have defined a new semantics of
Hoare logic, and shown the soundness and completeness of its axiom system
w.r.t. the new semantics; various comparisons have shown that our approach
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is not only mathematically elegant, but also practically useful.
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